CSUTCB mobilization Sep 2000
CSUTCB mobilization Sep 2000
In September 2000, Bolivia experienced a significant indigenous uprising led by the Unified Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB) under the leadership of Felipe Quispe. This mass mobilization included a nationwide peasant-led blockade, supported by allied social movements such as the Confederation of Street Vendors of El Alto, the Confederation of Rural Education Teachers of Bolivia, and the Federation of Interprovincial Transport Workers of La Paz. The blockades, which began on September 11 and lasted until October 7, effectively paralyzed the country, leading to shortages of food and essential goods in major cities like La Paz and El Alto (Healy 2004, 28). During the conflict, nine people, including peasants and coca growers, died, and more than 127 were injured (García Linera, Chávez León, Marxa, and Costas Monje, Patricia 2010, 123).
The initial mobilization strategy involved blocking key transportation routes, including the highways connecting La Paz to Oruro, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Desaguadero, Copacabana, and Yungas. The Six Federations of Coca Growers demanded that the government abandon its commitment to coca eradication and halt the construction of three U.S.-funded military bases in Chapare (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 168). Meanwhile, a teachers’ union strike included a long march from Oruro to La Paz. The blockades, which grew increasingly militant, evolved from isolated road closures to mass gatherings preparing for a large-scale march toward the capital, with over 50,000 people assembling in Achacachi alone (Ledebur 2002).
As the mobilization extended into late September, government forces attempted to dismantle the blockades through violent repression. On September 24, skirmishes erupted in Parotani and Guaqui, where military regiments and government forces used dump trucks to remove barricades. Security forces fired tear gas and live ammunition at protesters, who responded with stones. In Guaqui, Modesto Mamani (46), an indigenous protestor, was shot and killed by security forces while he was alerting the community of military presence (Ramirez, Pablo Mamani 2005, 98). His death intensified public outrage and strengthening the resolve of the mobilized communities. In response, the CSUTCB decided to expand the blockades to the outskirts of El Alto, pushing the conflict into urban spaces (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014, 204).
The CSUTCB issued a statement condemning the government’s actions:
“Yesterday, we were brutally repressed on the La Paz-Desaguadero highway in K’asa. There are deaths, injuries, and dozens detained. The government continues to massacre us with military force.” (Ramirez, Pablo Mamani 2005, 98)
By September 26, transportation was paralyzed in seven of Bolivia’s nine departments. Reports of clashes between military forces and indigenous protesters surfaced in Pacajes and Ingavi provinces, though no fatalities were recorded. The movement escalated, with protesters digging ditches across major highways to reinforce their roadblocks (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014, 204).
On September 28, the most violent confrontation occurred near Huarina, north of La Paz. Military units, backed by aerial support, launched an aggressive assault on peasant roadblocks. Despite their attempts to resist using stones, the protesters were overwhelmed by the firepower of government forces. The clash resulted in the deaths of three community members: Toribio Chui (70), a school janitor from Utavi, Joaquin Morales (32), a rural teacher from Copacabana, and Cirilo Choquehuanca (40), a community member from Antacollo. Five others were seriously injured during the attack. Witness testimonies, including that of Franciscan nun Gladys Estal Yano, described military forces indiscriminately firing on unarmed protesters, supported by low-flying aircraft dispersing tear gas and live rounds (Ramirez, Pablo Mamani 2005, 100). Following the massacre, emergency assemblies among peasant organizations led to a decision to maintain and intensify the blockades.
By early October, after nearly a month of mass mobilization and violent repression, the Banzer government faced an untenable situation. Unable to regain control of the blocked territories, officials convened negotiations with CSUTCB and allied unions. Between October 5 and 7, agreements were reached, including the cancellation of the three U.S.-funded military bases in Chapare and new concessions for teachers and peasant organizations (García Linera, Chávez León, Marxa, and Costas Monje, Patricia 2010, 123).
The September 2000 mobilization was a turning point in Bolivia’s contemporary indigenous resistance movements. The events exposed deep ethnic and social fractures within Bolivian society. In interviews, Felipe Quispe dismissed claims that he sought to “divide” Bolivia, asserting instead that Bolivia was already divided along racial and economic lines. He argued that the mobilization was an expression of the “hidden Bolivia”—a resurgence of indigenous identity and resistance against centuries of marginalization (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014, 43).
This period of unrest set the stage for further mobilizations in the early 2000s, culminating in the Gas War of 2003 and the eventual election of Evo Morales, Bolivia’s first indigenous president, in 2005. The September 2000 uprising demonstrated the growing power of indigenous-led mass mobilizations and solidified the role of the CSUTCB and other social movements in shaping Bolivia’s political future.