Parotani Triennial Plan protest
Overview:
During a wave of coordinated protests by coca growers and peasants, deadly repression by the Bolivian police and army claimed the lives of at least five protesters on May 28, 1987 in the towns of Parotani, west of the city of Cochabamba, and La Angostura. Protesting cocaleros were blockading the highway in Parotani, as well as two other locations, in opposition the Triennial Plan (Plan Trienal) were met with violent reprisals from state security forces sent to disperse the blockade (Salazar Ortuño 2008, 119–30).
At Parotani, the violence began with an accidental self-inflicted gunshot by soldier Carlos Caballero Juárez. Two adult male coca growers were confirmed dead at Parotani, as was a two-month-old child who was beaten to death. Witnesses reported seeing another woman dead on a military truck, but this could not be confirmed by an investigation. Another peasant protester was killed at La Angostura.
An investigation into the events found that the violence was a product of governmental intervention. The protesters were unarmed and did not provoke a confrontation. At least five protesters were killed, 24 injured, and at least 28 were missing, and initially presumed disappeared. The Investigative Commission was able to locate all but ten of them, and listed the remaining missing whose whereabouts remained to be determined (ASOFAMD 1987, 44). Of them, Ramón Gonzalez (30), Federico Sánchez Balbo, Francisco Mancilla Cañari, Froilán Vicente were confirmed as disappeared. The also found that Gumercindo Portillo (on the disappeared list) voluntarily enlisted in the armed forces after the confrontation, and that five others (none of them on the disappeared list) were forcibly recruited. (ASOFAMD 1987, 45–46)
Following the deaths, the government reopened negotiations with the coca growers’ movement and its allies. The government, COB, CSUTCB, and coca-growers’ federations of the Chapare and of the La Paz Yungas signed an agreement on June 6 on the withdrawal of the Triennial Plan, the end of involuntary coca eradication, and the legalization of coca cultivation (Dunkerly 1990:42). The agreement called for the end of involuntary eradication and legalized coca cultivation. This agreement was further ratified in February of 1988 through the implementation of the Plan Integral de Desarrollo y Sustitución, Integrated Development and Crop Substitution Plan (PIDYS) (Centro de Documentación e Información - Bolivia (CEDIB) and Lohman 1992). The plan secured the right of cocaleros to participate in future decisions about financial and economic investigations in the Chapare. Their participation was a precondition for voluntary eradication (Healy 1991). These moves would later be reversed by Law 1008 in 1988. Protesters and the government agreed on the withdrawal of the Triennial Plan, the end of involuntary coca eradication, and the legalization of coca cultivation.
According to researchers Álvaro García Linera, Marxa Chávez Léon, and Patricia Costas Monje, the protest was a turning point for the Chapare coca growers’ union: “Beginning in these moments, the union, which had had lax existence dedicated to domestic concerns of each locality, began to tense itself to become a structure for social mobilization confronting the state (A partir de estos momentos, el sindicato, que había tenido una existencia laxa y dedicada a asuntos domésticos de cada localidad, comenzó a tensarse para convertirse en una estructura de movilización social enfrentada al Estado)” (García Linera, Chávez León, Marxa, and Costas Monje, Patricia 2010, 396).
Background information
The 1980s in Bolivia were marked with increased coca eradication efforts, often aligned with or following the direction of US influence. The Chapare and Carrasco were areas in Bolivia rich in coca cultivation. Framed by the intensification of the drug war in the United States, the 1986 US Foreign Assistance Act for US aid to Bolivia (drafted in 1985) was contingent on the eradication of 1,000 hectares of coca for Bolivia to receive full US funding (Dunkerley 1990). Intensified eradication efforts and US influence prompted more confrontations between cocaleros resisting eradication and militarized troops. Echoing increased eradication efforts, in January of 1987 the government introduced the Plan Trienal para la Lucha contra el Narcotrafico the Trienal Plan for the fight against nacro- trafficking). The Plan called for the eradication of 50,000 hectares of coca by 1990, foreshadowing further militarized actions and protests.
After the plan was announced in January 1987, Chapare coca growers, the CSUTCB national peasant federation, and the COB national labor confederation publicly organized against it (Hoy 1987b). In March of 1987, the COB, the Central Obrera Boliviana, the most prominent union in Bolivia, declared a State of Emergency, joining ongoing protests against the plan and continuing eradication efforts (Dunkerley 1990). By May, other protests were active on issues confronting fired mine works from Comibol. Peasant unions nationwide, organized thorugh the CSUTCB backed the cocalero’s demands and raised concerns of their own. Following this unrest on May 21st the “Quelco” of Federación Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos del Departamento de Oruro began negotiations with the government over the Trienal plan and the Controlled substance law in which they requested the suspension of the Trienal Plan. After five days of negotiations without reaching an agreement, coca producers set up a blockade of cars at three main points:
In Chiñata on the Chapare highway
In Angostura on the road to Santa Cruz
In Parotani on the road from Oruro to La Paz.
In so doing, the protesters effectively isolated the city of Cochabamba, cutting off all three main roadways to other cities.
Events of May 28, 1987
Following the breakdown of negotiations between the government and cocaleros over the proposed implementation of the Trienal Plan the Confederación Unica de los agrarios called for blockades at several key chokepoints in Cochabamba (ASOFAMD 1987). About 5,000 Campesinos formed blockades at three main points:on the road to Oruro, near Angostura, and on the road to Chapare blocking hundreds of vehicles. At the same time CSUTCB called for a general strike and rejected accusations that protest blockades were linked to narco-trafficking (Hoy 1987b).
In Parotani, the blockade began on May 26th. Cocaleros arrived from various surrounding areas in Chapare and Carrasco to protect their right to grow coca. The first two days of the blockade passed peacefully. Blockaders let people pass as normal but prevented transport trucks from La Paz, Oruro, and Cochabamba from passing through (Hoy 1987b). In response to the blockades the President of the Civic Committee, Carlos Quiroga, asked that the protesters at least allow trucks carrying foods to pass. At the same time, the government issued a demand that protesters clear the road by 6:30 pm on May 27th but issued no concessions to cocaleros demands contesting the Plan Trienal (Hoy 1987g). Protesters continued to occupy the blockade. On May 28th soldiers arrived in the early morning between 5 and 5:30 and began to circle the blockaders and force them off of the road cajoling and beating them into submission. This continued until 8 am when the protesters began singing the national anthem to maintain calm. However, a soldier accidentally fired a weapon hitting himself in the chest and falling instantly. The soldier was killed. (ASOFAMD 1987, 26, 28.). Accounts from the blockaders insist that protesters themselves did not have any weaponry and that the gunshot to the solider was a result of his own error. Manuel Lopez Caveros, a protester recounts hearing a soldier yell that the death of the soldier was the fault of the protesters and that if blockaders did not disperse the troops would begin shooting (ASOFAMD 1987, 26, 29.). Shortly after, more security forces arrived from Oruro armed with rifles, machine guns, and tear gas and began firing indiscriminately at the protesters and beating them with rifle butts. Blockaders began to flee as they were fired upon and wounded.
Blockaders suffered wounds from both bullets, beatings, and tear gas canisters that were dispersed by the soldiers. In addition to the death of the soldier, four other protesters were killed in the confrontations. Ponciano Salazar, 45 years old, died from a gunshot wound to the neck that shattered his spinal column. In addition, a young woman Evarista de Sánchez with her two month old son was beaten at the blockade. The two month old died in the evening as a consequence of the wound. In addition, during the commotion, campesino, Pedro Mamani Aguilar was accidentally killed when he was stuck by a car. Sources also document one additional death. In total, the confrontations resulted in 5 deaths, over two dozen injuries, at least 28 disappearances, and between 500(Hoy 1987f) to 600 detentions (Hoy 1987e).
The Dead:
Ponciano Salazar, cocalero belonging to Sindicato de Cerro Verde, Central Eterazama. Killed by 22 caliber gunshot to the head at Parotani. The bullet lodged in and partially destroyed his brain. He had no other signs of trauma, per autopsy report reprinted in Hoy (Hoy 1987a). 45 to 50 years old.
Carlos Caballero Juárez, young conscript (per ASOFAMD). The COB and two witnesses whose tesitmony is included by ASOFAMD concur that the solider banged his weapon against the ground causing it to fire, killing him. The COB report (ASOFAMD 1987, 56–57) also makes a pretty compelling case that the government’s version is not consistent with the destruction of the back of the soldier’s skull.
Faustino Durán, cocalero: “Hay denuncias de la muerte del campesino Faustino Durán, de un niño de dos meses de edad y de una mujer no identificada” (Details seem to be on the missing pages 36 and 37 of this report)
Anonymous woman: A witness “saw a dead woman who was being carried in large truck. The military was carrying her, but they would not let him see to identify the woman, and said she was from Puerto Alegre.” ASOFAMD report decides to “include this case in the list of deaths that were a consequences of the breaking up of the blockade,” but also indicates “It was not possible to get greater information, so it is difficult to accept or deny this act.”
Two month old child of Evarista de Sánchez: Erasmo Rojas denounced as follows to the 4 Federaciones’ investigative (translation): “Mrs. Evarista de Sánchez with her male child of two months was brutally damaged by blows with rifle butts and kicks, during the Parotani blockade on May 28, and as a consequence of that, the baby died on Saturday night, and buried on Sunday in Sacaba’s cemetery.” They could not further confirm this death.
Vicente Ferrufino: Appears in a single newspaper account, and death occurred in a separate blockade. Likely not investigated by ASOFAMD commission which traveled to Chapare. Wilson Reynolds, leader of the Federación Especial de Campesinos del Trópico named two deaths on may 29: Ponciano Salazar at Parotani, and “Vicente Ferrufino, de Senda ‘Central Chimore’ who died in the Zone of La Angostura at 15 km from Cochabamba along the old route to Santa Cruz” (Hoy 1987c). Violence at La Angostura is also mentioned in a simultaneous article on the Civic Committee’s demands for an investigation of the deadly events.
Pedro Mamani Aguilar, who was initially included in the COB’s report on the events, died in a nonconflict car accident, per ASOFAMD’s investigation.
I’ve removed the second, unconfirmed anonymous death, which was only sourced to the claim there were two unidentified women. We have clarity about one and no extended information about another. Vicented Ferrufino’s death is only sourced to a newspaper account one day after his death, and thereby feels on shaky ground. And the lack of confirmation surrounding the anonymous woman also seem reasonable. On the other hand, we have a lot of detail regarding the fallen baby, and the lack of verification may just come down to the lack of autopsy and forensic information, ruled out by the quick burial. This illustrates the subjective nature of the “unconfirmed” flag, which I think should only attach to the witnessed unidentified fiemale dead body here.—CBJ
Follow-up:
Widespread outrage and condemnation towards the government from political parties and figures as well as civil society organizations followed the repression (Hoy 1987i). However, despite the repression, protesters reformed the blockades and announced a hunger strike until their demands were met: continued negotiations over the Trienal plan as well as the release of detained protesters, as well as the release of the bodies of those killed in the masacre (Hoy 1987d, 1987c). CSUTCB released a statement denouncing the repression at Parotani. At the same time, the MIR called for an emergency session of congress to hear a report on the events that took place at the blockade. The MIR denounced the militarized response to the protesters and called for accountability.
Following the event in Parotani, the 4 Federaciones del Tropico conducted an investigation to document the days events and collect information on who was killed, injured and disappeared. The federation collected a multitude of testimonies from protesters who were present and suffered injuried. Through these accounts they pieced together an overview of the day and were able to detail others who were disappeared in the commotion. On June 22nd, following the investigation, the investigative commision, delegates from ASOFAMD, and delegates from Departmental Assembly of Human Rights met with the Prefect of the Department to present a preliminary report of the days events. The account underscored the current political tension framed by the US’s “war on drugs” and its pressure on foreign “poorer nations” to address the problem (ASOFAMD 1987, 52). Furthermore, it noted that the presence of State troops in situations of protest only increases tension, violence, and deadly outcomes.
Government denials:
The government issued a series of statements, which were either paraphrased or printed in full by Hoy. In its longer comments, issued May 29, The Ministry of Information asserted,
“Las acciones de los efectivos militares y policiales encargados de tal tarea, estuviero rodeadas de la mayor prudencia. Lamentablemente, en la localidad de Parotani, a 40 Km. sobre la carretera a Oruro, elementos infiltrados entre los campesinos, resistieron la acción de los efectivos del orden con disparos de armas de fuego que dieron como resultado la muerte del conscripto Carlos Caballeo y del campesino Ponciano Salazar, tal como lo acreditan los certificados forenses.”(Hoy 1987h)