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Unarmed Militancy:
Tactical Victories, Subjectivity, and Legitimacy in Bolivian Street Protest

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ABSTRACT Moments of intense physical confrontation between protesters and security forces have become iconic parts of political protest. These asymmetrical tactical encounters have been pivotal to successful Latin American revolts against neoliberalism and regime-displacing protest movements. Based on ethnographic engagement and oral history interviews with Bolivian activists in Cochabamba and La Paz, this article characterizes an overlooked tactical stance: *unarmed militancy*, which I define as the use of forceful, combative tactics that are nonetheless qualitatively less damaging than those of their (usually state) adversaries. Unarmed militants complicate the binary of violence and nonviolence often used to strategize and analyze protest. Unarmed militants claim some of the moral purity of nonviolence and of those victimized by state repression. Yet they also physically fight back to hold physical space and interrupt daily life. Neither provocateurs nor extremists, unarmed militants collaborate in achieving the tactical and strategic goals of mass mobilizations. This article examines the material processes of on-the-street collaboration, the subjectivity of demonstrators, the narratives surrounding protest, and the moral understandings of just and unjust uses of force as elements that can make unarmed militancy effective. [*political legitimacy, tactics, protest, repression, revolution*]

RESUMEN Momentos de confrontación física intensa entre manifestantes y fuerzas de seguridad han llegado a ser partes icónicas de la protesta política. Estos encuentros tácticos asimétricos han sido cruciales para las revueltas latinoamericanas exitosas en contra del neoliberalismo y los movimientos de protesta para desplazar regímenes. Basado en envolvimiento etnográfico y entrevistas de historia oral con activistas bolivianos en Cochabamba y La Paz, este artículo caracteriza una posición táctica ignorada: *militancia no armada*, la cual defino como el uso de tácticas enérgicas y combativas que son sin embargo cualitativamente menos dañinas que aquellas de sus adversarios (usualmente estatales). Militantes desarmados complican el binario de violencia y no violencia a menudo usado para planear estrategias y analizar la protesta. Militantes desarmados reclaman parte de la pureza moral de la no violencia y la de aquellos victimizados por el estado represivo. Sin embargo, ellos también contraatacan físicamente para mantener el espacio físico e interrumpir la vida diaria. Ni provocadores ni extremistas, militantes desarmados colaboran en lograr las metas

tácticas y estratégicas de las movilizaciones masivas. Este artículo examina los procesos materiales de colaboración en la calle, la subjetividad de los manifestantes, las narrativas que rodean la protesta, y los entendimientos morales de los usos justos e injustos de la fuerza como elementos que pueden hacer efectiva la militancia desarmada. [*legitimidad política, tácticas, protesta, represión, revolución*]

Marcelo Rojas, then a politicized young adult from the city's central zone, remembers the February 2000 "taking [*toma*] of Cochabamba" as what "lit the spark" for the Water War, Bolivia's first successful antiprivatization protest in a generation (interview, December 7, 2010). He joined the early-morning crowd on February 4 with his neighbors and the bricklayers who worked for his uncle, a crew that expected police hostility and marched with bandanas over their faces to hide their identities. The Coordinadora for the Defense of Water and Life[i] had called for the *toma* as a "great mobilization of the whole urban and rural population of Cochabamba" to resist the privatization of the city's water system (Comunicado No. 9, January 27, 2000).[ii] Under the terms of the September 1999 contract, the corporation Aguas del Tunari[iii] took ownership of the utility, all waters within the municipality, and the community water infrastructure built by hand in poorer neighborhoods.

Cochabamba, Bolivia's fourth-largest city, anchors the country's fertile and temperate middle-altitude region, just below where hard-scrabble mountains give way to agrarian greenery. Since 1950, the urbanized areas of Cochabamba have exploded outwards. Their neighborhoods, partially self-constructed, fan across former farmland and climb the dusty hills of the Zona Sur (Southern Zone). Neither planners nor utility services proved capable of keeping pace with the expanding population's needs (Goldstein 2004), and outer residents built their own wells and water tanks to get by. The water-privatization contract, and the rate hike that came in its wake, gave urban and rural Cochabambans across class lines something to fight against together. A broad grassroots coalition of peasant irrigators, workers, businesses, neighborhoods, and unaffiliated protesters participated in three major waves of protest in January, February, and April 2000 (Albro 2005; Assies 2001; Spronk 2007).

Farmers defending their irrigation rights led the marchers from Tiquipaya—with Marcelo among them—to converge with another column from Vinto and Quillacollo two kilometers west of downtown. Up to this point, the event reflected "the discipline, neat lines, and the organization into corporate blocs" that Sían Lazar (2015, 246) identifies as "the expression of a political agency . . . constituted by disciplined collectivity." It was there, after the marches combined, that they encountered the well-armed antiriot unit of Bolivia's national police. Marcelo and his fellow marchers were thrown into two days of iconic street confrontations. Protesters tossed back painfully hot teargas canisters, gathered debris into makeshift barricades,

and used cloths soaked in vinegar, soda, and even urine to protect their eyes and noses from the effects of the gas. To advance, they hurled stones and fireworks at police lines and urged the crowd to surge forward, moving block by block. Elsewhere, thousands more marchers headed in from the east and south. At each site, the determined crowd eventually overwhelmed the police while advancing toward the Plaza 14 de Septiembre (hereafter, "Plaza").

At five minutes to eleven on the night of February 5, Bolivian security forces gave up their defense of Cochabamba's central square and retreated to a thin line under the balconies of the Departmental Palace. In just two days, the police had launched over seven thousand canisters of teargas and fired ten thousand rounds of rubber bullets (*Opinión*, February 9, 2000) to enforce the prohibition on occupying the Plaza, sending scores of protesters to the hospital. Within minutes, the troops were standing face-to-face with some two thousand joyous Cochabambans. The protesters bore the signs of a hard fight and still wore bandanas wet with vinegar. They whooped and chanted "We have won!" and shouted demands. Already, the government had agreed to renegotiate the hated water contract, return fees to the precontract level, and release arrested protesters. A final round of protest in April would compel the government to revoke the contract altogether, turning Cochabamba into a international symbol of resistance to neoliberal globalization.

This article examines the tactical approach of protests like this one, which combine peaceful expressive activity and forceful confrontation with security forces. In Bolivia and elsewhere, there is a zone of overlap within this apparent binary, which I will term *unarmed militancy*. I define unarmed militancy as the use of forceful, combative tactics—such as barricades, property destruction, hands-on pushes, and thrown projectiles—in political mobilization to serve symbolic, tactical, and strategic goals.[iv] Prior to the *toma*, the Coordinadora activists had promised a symbolic takeover "in the sense that the campesinos, workers, and inhabitants of those neighborhoods that have been disadvantaged . . . will enter the city and . . . will make their voice heard [*Los Tiempos*'s paraphrase]," an event "which for our part will be peaceful" ("Insisten En Que La Toma Será Pacífica." *Los Tiempos*, January 31, 2000; Comunicado No. 10, January 28, 2000). Then, in a communiqué written in the aftermath of taking the Plaza, the Coordinadora claimed the battle as their own: "We entered into the Plaza after two days of battle, just as we said we would, jubilantly, to say that Cochabamba does not yield, that our water is not for sale, to take back the right to speak [*recuperar la palabra*] and democracy" (Comunicado, February 6, 2000).

Despite their martial language, the protesters' success was not a military victory, achieved by injuring opponents and removing them from the contest. Rather, the protesters had gradually gained ground within the city and remained resilient

while police expended their nonlethal munitions. These tactical achievements in the streets had political effects. As Marcelo recounted, "We broke through the gap, we broke through the police," and from there, "We said, 'Let's negotiate,' because they knew we had overcome the police, and the riot squads" (interview, December 7, 2010). At the same time, the protesters maintained a fundamental moral distinction between the police "repression" and their own "resistance." Instead of escalating the violence of their actions, they prolonged and extended the confrontation while remaining less violent than their state adversaries. Victory came through a combination of tactical and moral advantage.

Cochabamba's Water War typified a continent-wide wave of protest against neoliberal globalization and the governments that embraced it. Across Latin America, people in the tens or hundreds of thousands marched, blockaded roads and erected barricades, and thronged city streets to challenge neoliberal economic policies and demand new rights for the poor, marginalized, and Indigenous. This constellation of protest tactics appeared in Venezuela during the 1989 Caracas fuel protests, in regional and national mobilizations in Argentina since 1993 (Auyero 2003), in a wave of Bolivian mass mobilizations beginning in 1999 (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014), and in the 2006 uprising led by the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca (Stephen 2013). When protests against gas privatization led to the resignation of two Bolivian presidents, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in 2003 and Carlos Mesa in 2005, protesters demonstrated the far-reaching political significance of militant street protest combined with mass mobilization.

The form of Latin American protest at the turn of the century echoed worldwide a decade later. When *Time* magazine chose a collective person of the year in 2011, the dozens of people photographed to depict "The Protester" within were each asked to bring a memento of their experience. The most-common objects chosen were protective masks to resist tear gas and material evidence of violence they endured, followed by communications technology. Shell casings, scars, crutches, and limbs encased in casts all reflect the practical experience of state violence, while masks and other preparations express a commitment to risk enduring it again (see Figure 1 for an analogous image from Cochabamba). In *Time*'s imagery, the protester of 2011—in the Arab Spring; the anti-austerity protests of Greece, Spain, and the United Kingdom; and the Occupy movement in the United States—wears the same masks, bears the same wounds, and faces many of the same dilemmas as their Latin American forerunners. They occupy an iconic space in the global mediascape, a space of defiance and danger, a place where very distinctly equipped adversaries meet in confrontation.

In this article, I use the experiences of Bolivia to bring into focus methods of struggle that are iconic elements of political conflict but that are poorly theorized by existing models of collective action. By using unarmed militant means, protesters create tactical encounters in which numerically greater but qualitatively lesser force can outlast or physically overcome a movement's adversaries. These tactics enable crowds to hold significant urban spaces in defiance of state repression and to directly interrupt commerce and mobility. In the form of blockades, they can turn "urban (im)mobility" into "a tool of political mobilization," as Claudio Sopranzetti (2014, 122) observes regarding recent Thai protests. When used in defense of mass public gatherings, unarmed militant tactics can generate prolonged "prefigurative moments" for "alternative forms of community, authority and collectivity," as Yarimar Bonilla (2010, 127) found in Guadeloupe. These forces can succeed—as they have in both these national contexts and Bolivia—when they achieve both tactical success through mass mobilization and moral legitimacy by differentiating themselves as more democratic and less violent than their adversaries.

The theoretical work surrounding armed struggle and nonviolence, performed by both practitioners and academics, has perhaps been *too* effective, producing a dichotomous understanding of tactics that inhibits understanding. Witness the divergent interpretations of the Water War. The Global Nonviolent Action Database describes the February battle in such terms as "soldiers and riot police unleashed teargas on the demonstrators and used clubs almost immediately, but many demonstrators outmaneuvered them," and it frames confrontation as an add-on to the mobilization: "Despite violence, protesters continued using many non-violent tactics to support each other in the struggle" (Cadambi and Rennebohm 2011). Conversely, Lorgio Orellana Aillón (2004, 524, 529) saw in the April mobilization an "insurrectionary process," with the public in a "state of militarization," "totally alien to petty-bourgeois intellectual moralism; it was, on principle, an illegal, immoral act, from the point of view of the owning classes." The narratives of what Anna Feigenbaum, Fabian Frenzel, and Patrick McCurdy (2013, 125) call "the academic and activist binary of violent and non-violent" are so powerful that they occlude understanding of what lies between them. Echoing prior anthropological questioning of binaries (nature and culture, sacred and profane, fighter and victim), I propose that up-close engagement with unarmed militancy can show us a form of political praxis that lies between and "beyond violence and nonviolence" (in the phrasing of North American activist trainer Starhawk [2010]).

This article offers a picture of unarmed militancy based on observation of space-claiming protests, oral history interviews with protest participants, and tactically aware historical research on moments of conflict. I conducted one year of

fieldwork in urban Bolivia in 2010–2011, along with several shorter visits between 2008 and 2015, to describe and explain how mass protest affected the existing balance of power, reshaping relations of class, race, and authority (Bjork-James 2013, 2020). This work built on my prior engagement with Bolivian movements through the movement against corporate globalization. In North America, my activism has included participating and training others in nonviolent direct-action protest and participating in mass protests—such as at the 2003 FTAA summit in Miami—where protesters and police engaged in prolonged street confrontations.

In Bolivia, fierce, confrontational, property-destroying and property-repurposing forms of mass action coexist within a larger strategy of mass mobilization against a more violent state adversary. Narrative understandings of militancy and repression, the subjectivity of demonstrators, material processes of on-the-street collaboration, and moral understandings of just and unjust uses of force are all part of the social field that makes unarmed militancy effective. The first two sections below situate unarmed militancy as a highly visible but underexplored element of the "people power" revolutions of recent decades. The disciplined nonviolence that predominated in the Tiananmen Square and Eastern European uprisings of 1989 did not characterize the antineoliberal revolts at the turn of the century (of which Bolivia's is a significant example) or the wave of protest around 2011. But the emergent civil-resistance literature has minimized or overlooked the role of combative demonstrators, including in Bolivia. In the second section, I conceptualize unarmed militancy as a tactical stance toward protest encounters with practical, strategic, and ethical dimensions. I contrast unarmed militancy with two other tactical stances: armed struggle and nonviolence.

The next three sections focus directly on the Bolivian experience. Using oral history and documentary sources, I describe the materiality and strategic role, subjectivity, and narrative understandings of unarmed militancy. I first consider the materiality and tactical contribution of combative protest to larger mobilizations, in which it contributes to blocking, entering, and controlling vital urban spaces. These physical actions shape the subjectivity of demonstrators, notably because mass participation and physical cooperation across lines of gender, age, and class generate a sense of solidarity and democratic legitimacy. I also consider the combative subjectivity and identity of self-proclaimed "Water Warriors," which valorizes the role of forceful, unarmed resistance in popular struggles. Despite their bravado, these frontline militants ultimately relied on mass mobilization for their legitimacy and safety. Finally, I argue that we can best understand the martial language of unarmed militants as a social myth in the sense proposed by George Sorel (1915): a narrative frame that organizes understanding of social conflict. Activists strive to define the

repression against them as overwhelming, illegitimate, and destructive as part of their broader campaign for popular legitimacy.

THE ICONIC BUT UNDERTHEORIZED ROLE OF UNARMED MILITANTS

Revolutions are moments of upheaval that reveal the constructed nature of the political system and during which newly prominent collectivities act to reconstruct that system. Despite their presence in the imagery of protest (Figure 2), unarmed militants have been relatively neglected by the theorists of revolutionary change. While the smartphone, and the social networking technology it represents, has attracted widespread attention in studies of contemporary movements (Castells 2015; Tufekci 2017), on-the-ground tactical encounters have not. Nonetheless, the materiality and experiential consequences of protest confrontations have received attention from the field of contentious politics, classical political anthropologists, and (as discussed in the next section) a developing literature around "civil resistance."

Contentious-politics scholars examine large-scale patterns in the methods, process, and timing of collective political acts. Douglas McAdam and William Sewell (2001, 113–16) perceive a worldwide shift toward "people power" revolutions, signaled by the 1986 overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines but extending to the 1989 Eastern European revolts. In these instances, the preferred tactic was "nonviolent mass demonstrations" to "simply [show] their disgust, lack of fear, and unwillingness to cooperate." Unarmed militancy was the central approach in a number of other "people power" events, including the successful campaign to end apartheid in South Africa, the First Palestinian Intifada (1987–1992), and the 1977–1982 effort to end Bolivian military rule. Early twenty-first-century protests against neoliberalism in Latin America followed this broader tactical repertoire: combining mass demonstrations with unarmed militancy.

Revolutionary events are marked by a widely held sense of immediacy: as Melissa Rosario (2014) characterizes it, "an embodied sense of political possibility" in which participants "unfix the future from a knowable thing to a malleable thing." Within these pivotal periods, actions on a limited scale stand in for larger social forces and, when successful, authorize widespread and enduring changes in the political or social order. Decades ago, Émile Durkheim (1915) offered the notion of "collective effervescence," and later, Victor Turner (1969) explored communitas, repurposing the anthropology of religion to characterize revolution. Turner proposed that such collectively felt states constitute "anti-structures" that are dangerous to existing social orders and that have the potential to facilitate their transformation.

Despite this early theoretical attention, as Bjørn Thomassen (2012, 681–82) found, "Anthropologists have, with a very few exceptions, generally refrained from

studying actual political revolutionary events as ethnographic cases." Recently, however, the changing characteristics of revolution—and movements that aspire to revolution—have allowed ethnographers to experience these movements and document dramatic events at a closer distance. In the Global North, Jeffrey Juris's study (2008a) of European activists and David Graeber's North America–based *Direct Action* (2009) looked ethnographically at large-scale nonviolent direct actions and street confrontations. In Latin America and the Middle East, potentially revolutionary situations are fast becoming a significant kind of fieldsite.[v] Careful ethnographic examination of the material ways political contention is carried out can illuminate the temporality, subject-forming aspects, collaborative features, and ethos of revolution as it is lived today.

UNARMED MILITANCY: BETWEEN VIOLENCE AND NONVIOLENCE

Physical acts of protest have been theorized as elements of a "repertoire of contention" by contentious-politics scholars (Tilly 1978, 232). But unarmed militancy is not just about forceful actions; it is about how these actions connect to strategic aims and moral claims. I propose *tactical stance* to denote an ensemble of attitudes and practices: how people exercise physical action in protest, how they perceive their personal and collective role in politics, how they interpret state repression, and how they formulate and judge appropriate responses to it. A tactical stance is a structure that combines tactics, ethics, and a theory of change.

The tactical stance of unarmed militancy lies between armed struggle and nonviolent direct action, and therefore at the crux of a decades-long debate over the appropriate means for achieving revolutionary social change. In armed struggle, an overarching centralized armed organization challenges the state on behalf of a broader grassroots rebellion. Armed militants confront and defeat their adversaries with lethal violence. Advocates of armed struggle articulate defensive and offensive purposes for using weapons and critique nonviolence as an inadequate or ineffective means for protecting participants or achieving sufficiently transformative political outcomes. For Malcolm X (1965), "It is criminal to teach a man not to defend himself when he is the constant victim of brutal attacks." Likewise, in his classic formulation of guerrilla warfare, Che Guevara (2002, 153, 155) champions defensive violence—"the defense must be armed so that the popular forces will not merely become recipients of the enemy's blows"—and argues that eventual violent confrontation is inevitable: "accepting as true that the enemy will fight to maintain itself in power, one must think about destroying the oppressor army." In the struggle against colonialism, Frantz Fanon (2004, 51) wrote, "The violence of the colonized . . . unifies the people" through collective mobilization, while "at the individual level . . . it rids the colonized

of their inferiority complex," demonstrating that neither the colonial power nor their local leaders are their superior.

Practitioners of nonviolence organize disruptive actions to put pressure on the state but refuse the use of force to prevail. While they may provoke a repressive response, they choose to endure it without responding in kind. Mohandas Gandhi wrote that "suffering injury in one's own person is . . . of the essence of non-violence and it is the chosen substitute of violence to others" (quoted in Weber 1996, 61). Nonviolent protesters' endurance and visible suffering make the cost of confronting them unbearable—personally, morally, or politically. Martin Luther King Jr. (1964, 36, 37) saw suffering as a key feature of the "peaceable weapon of nonviolent direct action": "Instead of submitting to surreptitious cruelty in thousands of dark jail cells and on countless shadowed street corners, he would force his oppressor to commit his brutality openly—in the light of day—and with the rest of the world looking on." King (1968) and Gene Sharp (2012, 55) also advocated "mass noncooperation and defiance" that "dislocate the functioning of a city," so that the opponent's "ability to control the economic, social and political process of government and the society is in fact taken away."

Nonviolence and armed struggle are both conceived as transforming the embodied self of the person engaged in resisting oppression, and thereby their political situation. Armed struggle refuses to accept the one-sided physical vulnerability of the oppressed to structural violence and responds by demonstrating that the powerful and powerless have equally vulnerable bodies (Fanon 2004, 40–52). Nonviolence, by contrast, integrates vulnerability and suffering into the political conversation, making them visible. Scholarly inquiries into the techniques of the body (Mauss [1934] 1973) involved in protest situate the suffering and/or resisting body as a vital political sign and a prolific source of social meaning. Allen Feldman (1991, 250; see also Machin 2016) describes hunger striking by Irish Republican prisoners as "a newly acquired discipline of the body" that led to "intensified production of political texts." Lena Meari (2014) characterizes Palestinians' *sumud* (steadfastness) as "an anticolonial mode of being" that manages and resignifies the pain inflicted by Israeli security forces during interrogation. María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo (2003, 90–98), examining the narratives produced by Latin American guerrilla leaders, identifies discovery of self, community, and revolutionary egalitarianism as consequences of the work of bodily survival.

When one takes armed struggle and nonviolence as the only available alternatives, the difference seems reducible to the "means" of action. Their ethical and strategic foundations are so much at odds, however, that they are rarely considered together.[vi] A principled nonviolent position holds that armed struggle involves the use

of "bad means," which inevitably lead to bad ends. In Mohandas Gandhi's (1999, 309) formulation, "As the means so the end. Violent means will give violent *swaraj* [self-rule]. That would be a menace to the world and to India herself." Martin Luther King Jr. (1964, 1968) sought to convince African Americans that nonviolent tactics were superior tools to achieve Black liberation (although he also worked to explain the political meaning within urban rioting against racist conditions). Sharp's *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (1973) compiled nonviolent strategies to open up a conceptual space for these tactics in the social sciences. Whether for movement or academic ends, these writers emphasized the moral and strategic distinctions between nonviolent and violent action, denounced nearly all forms of property destruction, and opposed a combative stance toward state security forces. They argued that nonviolent tactics are as effective, and likely to be superior to, forceful alternatives.

The recent literature on civil resistance attempts to translate and empirically test the theories of strategic nonviolence. Sharon Erickson Nepstad (2011) and Kurt Schock (2005) took "people power" revolutions of the 1980s and 1990s as comparative case studies. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan (2011) applied the same approach to a data set of twentieth-century movements attempting to end colonial occupations or overthrow governments. Within this data set, both purely nonviolent mass mobilizations *and* those involving unarmed militant confrontation are coded as "nonviolent" in contrast to movements using firearms and primarily lethal means. Their core finding is that "nonviolent resistance has been strategically superior to violent resistance during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries" (17). Their research concludes that armed insurgency tends to discourage participation, limit involvement based on gender and age, and erode the moral advantage unarmed protesters have in the face of government repression (34–39, 41, 51). In the remainder of this article, as I explore various aspects of their praxis, I will show that these three faults need not apply to unarmed militancy.

Following the lead of nonviolent strategists, civil-resistance scholars have often dismissed unarmed militancy. Nepstad (2011, 35–37) partially attributes the deadly Chinese army violence in Tiananmen Square on June 3, 1989, to a failure of "nonviolent discipline" on the protesters' side. In public writing, Stephan (2018) conflates tactics such as "throwing punches" with research on "violent flanks" carrying firearms. Civil-resistance scholars' concepts often fail to recognize the variable local meanings of "nonviolence" or "peaceful" and disregard the role of combative actors. Their international and comparative approach reduces tactical stances to a dichotomous variable. South African, Palestinian, and Bolivian (1977–1982) movements, in which unarmed militancy played a central role, are qualified as "nonviolent" or "primarily nonviolent" in the civil-resistance literature (Chenoweth

and Stephan 2011, 233–36; Schock 2005, 56–68, 161). At times, including in their analysis of Bolivia, civil-resistance researchers have offered narratives of nonviolent protest infiltrated by small incursions of combative, destructive, or violent protesters, or omitted discussions of forceful protester tactics. The Global Nonviolent Action Database (https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu), for example, tends to peripheralize unarmed militant actions in its description of Bolivia's Water War, 2003–2005 gas protests, and the 1982 and 1983–1985 general strike waves. Stephen Zunes's (2018) description of the "largely nonviolent discipline" of the 1977–1982 movement against the dictatorship, and above all the resistance to the 1979 coup, illustrates how this descriptive approach ignores the tactical contribution—even centrality (Zavaleta Mercado 1983)—of stone-throwing, barricades, and paralyzing blockades to movement victories.

In the Global North, movements against neoliberal globalization, from the 1999 Seattle WTO protests to Occupy in 2011 and 2012, have been wracked by debates over unarmed militant tactics, largely framed in the violence/nonviolence binary (Feigenbaum, Frenzel, and McCurdy 2013, 122–25; Graeber 2009, 222–27; Juris 2005, 2008b). Northern unarmed militants often organize into "black blocs" (Thompson 2010) that performatively distinguish themselves (Juris 2005) from larger mobilizations and operate separately. Unarmed militants in the Global South, by contrast, often emerge *within* mass-movement organizations and cultivate broad, general participation in their confrontations.

The 2001 gathering of Peoples' Global Action—an antineoliberal activist network that includes Gandhian organizations from India as well as the Zapatista Army of National Liberation—brought this debate to Cochabamba. As activists from six continents reviewed their common statement of principles, they questioned and threw out prior language referring to "non-violent civil disobedience." For the Latin American movements present, "'non-violence' seemed to imply a rejection of huge parts of the history of resistance of [their] people." The conference offered the alternative phrase "direct action and civil disobedience . . . advocating forms of resistance which maximize respect for life and oppressed peoples' rights."[vii]

In Bolivia, activist and public discussion rarely centers on the violence/nonviolence dichotomy. Indeed, several of my interviewees did not recognize protester "resistance" and "violence" as the same thing. Among the movement activists I met with and studied in Bolivia, combative and pacific means stand alongside one another as interchangeable alternative elements in a common narrative structure.[viii] In their pocket-sized handbook *Métodos de lucha* (Methods of struggle), the Cochabamba Factory Workers' Federation labor education school draws no boundaries between self-sacrifice and force, so long as the means "achieves

positive responses to its demands" and "calls out the attention of the rest of the people." Evenhandedly, it notes, "some marches or mobilizations are no longer realized just carrying placards but rather by also carrying stones, sticks, or dynamite; while others are done with water balloons in hand." Bolivian teachers' unions, who have earned a reputation for labor militancy, have engaged simultaneously in both forceful street confrontations and hunger strikes, notably in a massive strike wave that provoked a state of emergency in 1989. This integrated view of protesters' tactical choices allows for the strategic inclusion of confrontational tactics within larger frameworks of protest.

MATERIAL ACTS AND STRATEGY IN CONTEMPORARY UNARMED MILITANCY IN BOLIVIA

Despite some assumptions to the contrary, unarmed militants—particularly in mass movements of the Global South—often maintain cooperative, even immersive, relationships with larger mass movements. The closer examination I offer here traces the integrated role of unarmed militants in Bolivian protest. Neither provocateurs nor extremists, these forceful protesters collaborated in achieving the tactical and strategic goals of mass mobilizations. Contrary to the expectations of both nonviolent strategists and civil-resistance scholars, unarmed militancy can amplify participation, involve diverse participants in collaborative action, and benefit from public revulsion at state violence.

While unarmed militant action can simply be a tool to enter or defend a public meeting place (as on February 4 and 5, 2000), more often it serves to reinforce coordinated actions to paralyze the economy. "What we in the Zona Sur decided was to blockade absolutely all of the roadways providing access to the city," Christian Mamani, a leader in the outlying neighborhood of Santa Vera Cruz, recalled. Economic life ground to a halt. "Nothing. The markets, closed. The shops, all of them closed" (interview, April 4, 2010). One of three comprehensive blockading efforts in the year 2000, the Water War reintroduced a model for collective action that would define mass grassroots mobilization for the next decade. In the Gas Wars of 2003 and 2005, the 2010 Potosí regional strike, and the December 2010 *gasolinazo* protests against a sudden fuel price hike (to name only the largest examples), protesters applied the same formula on a regional or national scale (Bjork-James 2013, 2020).

The civic strike (*paro cívico*) combines road blockades, marches, open confrontation with security forces, organizational endorsements of demands, hunger strikes, grassroots-organized referenda, open public meetings, and numerous symbolic actions carried out upon property, persons, and space. Like conventional union organizers, participants stage these events in a regular sequence of collective

organization, striking, escalation, negotiation, and concessions. But unlike in the Bolivian general strikes of the 1930s to 1980s, trade unions are not the protagonists of these economic shutdowns. "Rather than the traditional labor movement," Coordinadora spokesman Oscar Olivera (2004, 47) wrote, "it was the new world of work that came out into the streets: the unemployed, the self-employed, the young, and the women." As Sian Lazar (2006, 186ff) describes for El Alto, the labor union, neighborhood, and rural community of origin each provide "organisational bases for revolt" in contemporary uprisings. Multiple movements collaborate in a series of space-claiming actions, sometimes escalating into a total shutdown of commercial and civic life through coordinated marches, road blockades, enforced closures of businesses, and a general strike. In these forms of mass protest, tactical outcomes—control over space, access to symbolically important places, and impacts on commerce—matter. They provide economic leverage over the state and/or claim spaces that symbolize governance and popular democracy.

By taking over these spaces, protesters attract state intervention. Police and other security forces arrive in attempts to open roadways or keep demonstrators out of politically significant spaces, provoking confrontation. But the government's choice to repress protest generates a new vulnerability: if controlling protest is an expression of its rule, then failure to control it is a symbol of its powerlessness. The tactics chosen by unarmed militants deploy a numerical advantage to offset the state's capacity for violence. Stones laid on a highway or slingshots challenging riot police are useless unless the police are outnumbered, but highly effective when the protesters have the advantage of numbers. Protesters' weapons are harmful, but very rarely lethal. Hence, they suffer the vast majority of injuries and fatalities. Unarmed militants refuse to yield in confrontations with state forces; they fight back in uneven contests in order to hold physical space, obstruct the flows of daily life, and impose social costs.

On many days of the Water War, physical confrontation was nearly everywhere: thousands of stones, fireworks, and other objects were thrown toward the police in street battles. More stones, boulders, sections of rebar, tree limbs, and tires were brought into the streets to make them impassible or to serve as protective barricades for protests. Both women and men across wide spans of age and class status participated in confrontation, although men made up the majority of those on the front lines and those most severely injured.[ix] A young woman, dressed in the skirted chola style of the valleys, photographed while lobbing a stone at police lines with an equally traditional slingshot, became an icon of collective participation in the resistance (Figure 3). A more systematic study of women's participation listed the following as major tasks they carried out: "serving as roadblock delegates or chiefs,"

"carrying rocks, wire, etc., to enforce a blockade," "cooking in communal kitchens," "keeping watch," "providing protection against tear gas," and "responding to police repression with sticks and stones" (Bustamante, Peredo, and Udaeta 2005).

Marcela Olivera, at the time a core volunteer in the Coordinadora and later an international advocate against water privatization, recalls how in the movement's assembly, "You could identify the organizations, but in the end in the streets, there were people who came from their houses without belonging to any organization." While outlying blockades were often mounted by single organizations, divisions often broke down in the confrontations in the city center. Olivera remembers more aggressive actions among the wealthier locals as well: "I remember how right here [four blocks north of the Plaza] the *vecinos* ["neighbors," but implicitly middle-class ones] were making Molotov cocktails. Not the miners, not, *damn!*, the factory workers. It wasn't the coca growers. It was the *vecinos* who were preparing Molotov cocktails" (interview, April 5, 2011; emphasis in original).

The Coordinadora urged rural provinces, periurban communities, and outlying neighborhoods to organize blockade committees "to foresee all that is necessary for maintaining, communicating among, and sustaining them" in preparation for the April wave of conflict. During a weeklong regional blockade and general strike, crowds in the central city swelled into the tens of thousands. The central plaza was largely controlled by demonstrators, with unarmed militant protesters building barricades on its corners and one of them sounding the church bells when troops approached.[x] Many of these techniques were deployed in subsequent urban confrontations, culminating in the nationwide Gas War of 2003, and continued to be used in worker and transport-sector mobilizations I saw in Cochabamba and La Paz in 2010 and 2011.

SUBJECTIVITY AND FELT SOLIDARITY

At the subjective level, mass public participation in large-scale protests generates a profoundly felt but also empirically grounded sense of unity. As Jeffrey Juris (2008b) argues, collective action in the streets produces "affective solidarity," as shared emotional experiences drive mutual identification among allies who experience danger, uncertainty, relief, play, and joy in tandem.[xi] Unarmed militant practice amplifies these emotions: Through the experience of holding space against determined adversaries, participants illustrate to one another (and to themselves) popular unity, collective power, and capacity for sacrifice. Through it, one realized, "Our indignation was not ours alone, but rather that of the whole city, in all of Cochabamba," as activist Eliana Quiñones Guzmán recalled (interview, April 29, 2011).

Remembering an unknown man who fell just ahead of him from rubber bullets, neighborhood leader Ángel Hurtado is moved to speak of unity:

> He fell, and what are we to do? We can't just go over him. We had to lift and carry him away quickly. That is . . . there was a strength, a solidarity that was unique in that place. There, there were no left, right, or center parties, no tall or ugly, no Indian or gringo, nothing at all. All of us were one. That is what we learned as well. (interview, March 28, 2011)

What was tangibly happening at these moments of unity could be shared suffering, like the sting of tear gas; or shared risk, like not knowing if you would be shot; or acts of material aid from one person to the next (even minimal ones like sharing a newspaper or an onion). Yet all are taken as signs of deep bonds and the lack of separation between people. The commonality among these experiences, I argue, is the embodied equality of condition and mutual dependence: in the melee, unlike in the meeting, each body shares the same vulnerability, has the same needs, and must engage with others on a one-to-one basis. Such experience is "undifferentiated, egalitarian, direct, spontaneous, concrete, and unmediated," precisely the nature of the bonds created through communitas (E. Turner 2012, 4). Similarly, collaboration crossed lines of race, ethnicity, and gender, and this diversity was taken as a sign of the movement's strength and democratic legitimacy.[xii]

Marcelo Rojas's closest companions in risk-taking, initially "a handful" who met at the corner of Bolivar and Lanza, grew over the February days. This set of highly combative individuals built up a separate camaraderie. Along with scores of others who spent their days facing off with the police, they began to call themselves "guerreros de agua," or the "Water Warriors." The few published accounts describing the Water Warriors offer a common story. These "street brigades of men and women from the ranks of the unemployed, the poor, youths, and vagabonds . . . demonstrated incredible discipline" (Bustamante, Peredo, and Udaeta 2005, 80). Certainly not the only protesters to use force on the streets, they formed a hardened group within the confrontation whose days sometimes began and ended on the streets (Figure 4). Thomas Kruse (2005, 105ff) and Lorgio Orellana Aillón (2004, 478) characterize them as primarily marginal youths, "lumpen," "the 'nobodies' who for the space of a week were made into giants."[xiii] The acceptance of the urban poor, down to the shoeshiners and homeless youth who are stigmatized for the habit of glue sniffing, accentuated the cross-class solidarity of the larger movement.

In the final days of the Water War, protesters dragged construction equipment, doors, and tiles into the street to reinforce their barricades and protect themselves from police bullets (Figure 5). At least twenty-one protesters received bullet wounds, in addition to a teenage bystander who was shot dead by a

sharpshooter (*La Razón* 2000).[xiv] Protesters also attacked the buildings belonging to police and military units, destroying large parts of the riot-police compound and windows and office equipment at the Departmental Command. And yet, all this destabilization of police control (and all their personal militancy) did not prevent a group of Water Warriors, sixty or eighty in Marcelo's memory, from being isolated inside the Jesuit compound downtown on the final day of the conflict. The police and military "came in and began to threaten" them, focusing on the street kids "who would have to go back to the streets." Church officials and the crowd outside became their protectors. "The press arrived and we started to see the people, right? Very much filling the plaza, because we already had the news . . . [saying] the Water Warriors had won the battle, and had thrown out Aguas del Tunari. . . . All of the police were there watching, and they couldn't arrest us there."

At this final moment, then, the Water Warriors' defense from arrest was not their stones or blockades, but the public and their national visibility. Still, this invulnerability was felt as its own kind of power. "We went out from the main plaza and the Compañía de Jesus on a victory parade," described Marcelo. "Like this [*chanting*], 'Rifle, machine gun, the people will not be silenced.'[xv] Yes. All with shouts. 'Long live the Water War.'" This scene captures the dynamic interchange between combative action and mass public mobilization that makes unarmed militancy work. Neither street fighters nor large vocal crowds alone won the Water War. Ultimately, the riskiest physical actions still depended on public support to protect them from repression. Equally, the crowds that denounced the water privatization needed the crisis provoked by the regionwide blockade and the instability created by unarmed combat downtown to force their adversary out of town.

While Marcelo and his peers took on the mantle of Water Warriors and traveled across the country offering solidarity to the other struggles in 2000 and 2001, the term takes on a more inclusive meaning in his memory: "The Water Warriors are everyone, those who have fought directly and indirectly. Directly . . . by being in the streets confronting the police. Indirectly, those who brought the water, those who brought the vinegar, the food, all of that. All us Cochabambans, we are all Water Warriors" (interview, December 7, 2010). Protesters' personal subjectivity, then, was part and parcel of their larger narrative understanding of the conflict.

NARRATIVE: THE "BATTLE" AS A NOD TO THE PAST AND AN ORIENTING MYTH

The naming of the Water War and its February "battle" described above was not an outlier. It fell between the War of the Wells (rural Cochabamba, 1990s) and the Coca War (Sacaba and Cochabamba, 2002). Besides the Water Warriors in Cochabamba,

there was a "barracks" in the 2000 Aymara uprising in Achacachi. Participants in the 2003 Gas War declared the city of El Alto the "General Staff Headquarters" of the popular struggle (Estado Mayor del Pueblo). It is to these martial narrative frames, which are at once invocations of a tradition of struggle and orienting metaphors for understanding the present, that I now turn.

At one level, these narrative frames are a form of intergenerational citation (or intertextuality; see Lazar 2015) between present protests and events of the past. Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui (2010, 211–18) has long described the consciousness of Indigenous Bolivians as grounded in a memory of decades and centuries. From the 1920s to the 1960s, workers' movements consistently organized strikes and intermittently armed militias to back their active unionism, while violent rural uprisings culminated in the agrarian reform of 1953. Across Bolivia, certain sectoral organizations—El Alto's Neighborhood Councils, the Aymara Indigenous community of Achacachi, the Cooperative Miners' Federation in Potosí—cultivate a particularly militant profile and claim traditions of armed revolt as their political inheritance.

At a second level, martial language is purely descriptive. On February 5, 2000, local newspaper *Los Tiempos* described the city as "an immense battlefield in which police repression had no limits. . . . The troops did not limit their force and repressed pitilessly." These words of war are neither casual nor literal. Rather, martial language recognizes the presence of open, physical confrontation, the extended nature of the conflict, and the danger of participation.

At a third level, the language of war and battles is an interpretive frame. Between a resonant event and a larger revolution is a process of symbolic action and interpretation that draws in—and rewrites—notions of political participation, coercion, and legitimacy (Sewell 2005, 244–62). When French syndicalist Georges Sorel (1915, 22) wrote about the proletarian general strike, he focused on the way workers "picture their coming action as a battle in which their cause is certain to triumph," a viewpoint he called a social myth. When the strike begins, the theoretical division of society into antagonistic classes suddenly becomes real: "the interests and the different ways of thinking of . . . the foremen clerks, engineers, etc.," are set in sharp relief from "the workmen who alone go on strike" (144). The general strike as myth, wrote Sorel, serves as a sort of orientation kit, comprising map, compass, weaponry, and overall strategy. In "every circle which has been touched by the idea of the general strike . . . the slightest incidents of daily life become symptoms of the state of war between the classes . . . every conflict is an incident in the social war" (145). "The Water War was like a political school for many young people of my time," recalled Cochabamban activist María Eugenia Flores Castro, "It opened my eyes to see another reality that was all around me" (interview, April 14, 2011).

Protesters' narratives echo but do not replicate the narrative structure of a military confrontation. Unarmed militants know they cannot overcome the state through force alone. There is an asymmetry at the heart of the story: an asymmetry in means (stones vs. bullets) and an asymmetry in purposes. The language of massacre, of murder, and of repression is a critique of superior force: "We have succeeded in stopping the massacre that [the government] was preparing" (Coordinadora, February 6, 2000). Unlike when deployed in a battle, the government's deadly force is narrated as illegitimate and antidemocratic: "Murderers, murderers. . . . This is dictatorship," the crowd chanted on February 4.[xvi]

This distinction is maintained even as protesters' force is described as the embodiment of the people. Tactical means escalate in ways that keep them a notch below the state security forces they confront. When police shot forty-six people dead in El Alto during the 2003 Gas War, protesters built trenches and felled trees, lamp posts, and pedestrian bridges to obstruct principal roads through their city. Hugo Torres, the secretary of conflicts for the La Paz factory workers' union, recounted, "Our obligation was to defend, on one hand, our own lives, and those of our family, but also on the other hand, to fight once and for all for everyone, and to stop the massacre" (interview, April 14, 2010). Unarmed militants claims the moral purity of nonviolence and of those victimized by state repression. They ground this moral purity not on a refusal to do harm to property and persons but on the asymmetry that exists between them and the state in the means to do harm.

"There's no other way to fight," striking teacher Elvira Torrico Bellido told me on a barricade in 2011. "If we educators were to seek out another strategy, what would it be? Take our students hostage? A thing that is unworthy of us." Her comrade Lubia Vargas Padilla continued, "The only way that we are heard is this, because we have no other way to say 'no.' . . . So, if we don't use a coercive method, we achieve nothing" (interview, April 14, 2011). Sometimes, as in this case, "speaking" through militant action allows unarmed militant tactics to be integrated into the conventional cycle of labor conflict: collective organization, striking, escalation, negotiation, and concessions. At others (as in the Gas War), combative tactics are the expression of an emerging, unconventional political force that questions the right of the current government to rule, proposing that it has lost the mandate of the people.

CONCLUSION: UNARMED MILITANCY—A GLOBAL PHENOMENON

Mass grassroots participation in disruptive protest dramatically changed the course of Bolivian politics in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The Water War and the numerous civic strikes that followed combined multitudinous demonstrations,

paralyzing blockades, and combative street actions. As I have argued here, unarmed militant protest was integrated into these efforts and was both tactically and strategically significant. It made these mobilizations more difficult to repress, bolstered the sense of unity and communitas felt in the streets, and acted as a living symbol of both defiance of the state and collaboration across lines of social difference. Rather than sharing the strategic disadvantages of armed action, as identified by civil-resistance scholars, these mobilizations seemed to reap the strategic benefits of effective nonviolent action.

This examination of practice, narrative, subjectivity, and self-definition illustrates the strategic and often critical role unarmed militants can play in effective mass mobilization. Unarmed militants adopt the strategic imperatives of self-defense and control over space from armed struggle and of mass participation and moral distinction from nonviolence. When protesters leverage numbers and commitment to enable themselves to survive and resist police tactics, they are demonstrating a kind of power that combines physical efficacy and political legitimacy. Their encounter with state violence is marked by both heroism and suffering, and their practical and ethical choices must necessarily serve to distinguish their own acts from that of their adversaries. Confrontational militancy is not separate from the central work of mobilizing in large numbers and demonstrating broad popular support. The bodies of unarmed militants, whether defiant, wounded, or memorialized after their death, are potent political symbols of larger collectives. The practical acts and images created by confrontation contribute to the alchemy by which one set of state actions (or occasionally state actors) is repudiated and a new path is elevated as the natural expression of the will of the people.

Unarmed militancy is globally significant; forceful, resistant crowds play important roles in creating political openings. By disrupting the economic life of apartheid South Africa in the 1980s, seizing Argentina's streets in the December 2001 political crisis, and securing and defending access to Egypt's Tahrir Square in January 2011, unarmed militants played pivotal roles in major political transitions. Across the world, unarmed militants embrace a wide range of ideologies and strategies. Many of the tactics celebrated in the antiglobalization compendium *We Are Everywhere* (Notes from Nowhere 2003), for example, were echoed on the Maidan in Kyiv as part of the campaign for Ukraine to join (rather than protest) the European Union (Channell-Justice 2016). In Thailand, political factions have deployed unarmed militant tactics and road blockades to opposing ends over the past decade (Sopranzetti 2014). The terrain on which these actions are practiced, in terms of obstacles, traditions, legality, legitimacy, and collective memory, is also highly variable and situated in each context.

Nonetheless, there are imaginative, political, and emotional resonances between the many scenarios where unarmed militancy arises.[xvii] The circulation of images and narratives of collective action is intrinsic to each unarmed militant protest, part of the process of mobilizing, justifying, and contesting the armed forces they face down. Yet these images and narratives always circulate more broadly, drawing in a broader circle of interest. There are also signs of growing cross-movement attention and interchange linking unarmed militant activists across their sites of activity. The Water War inspired solidarity protests in San Francisco, New Yorkers traveled to Oaxaca and organized solidarity protests at the local Mexican consulate, and public missives were addressed from Tahrir Square veterans to the Occupy movement and from West Bank Palestinians to protesters in Ferguson, Missouri. These steps indicate that a vital global conversation among participants in unarmed militancy and theorists of their tactics and strategies is emerging. The accompanying process of scholarly theorization and comparative analysis—long-standing for armed struggles and increasingly solidified for the practice of nonviolence—is just coming into focus for unarmed militancy.

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FIGURE CAPTIONS

Figure 1. *Outraged participants in the Water War show the antiriot munitions thrown at the crowd by police and the handfuls of stones with which they responded. (Photograph by Thomas Kruse)*

Figure 2. *A 2010 mural by the collective Arte Willka commemorates the Water War by depicting a masked figure aiming a sling shot. The text reads, "The Water Is Ours." (Photograph by author)*
Figure 3. *Detail of* La Lucha Por El Agua Continúa (*The Struggle for Water Continues), a 2010 mural by Mona Caron on the wall of the Federation of Factory Workers of Cochabamba's complex on the west side of the city. (Courtesy of Mona Caron)*
Figure 4. *Water Warriors at a barricade in Cochabamba's central plaza. Marcelo "Banderas" Rojas is waving the flag. (Photograph from the personal collection of Marcelo Rojas)*
Figure 5. *Riot police with shields face off with protesters behind a makeshift barricade in Cochabamba, 2000. (Photograph by Thomas Kruse)*

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[i] The assembly-based Coordinadora Departamental por la Defensa del Agua y de la Vida was founded at a November 1999 assembly and acted as the coordinating body for grassroots mobilizations throughout the water conflict.
[ii] Coordinadora communiqués are reprinted in Olivera et al. (2008).
[iii] San Francisco–based Bechtel Holdings Inc. was the lead investor in Aguas de Tunari in September 1999; half of its stake was bought by Edison S.p.A. in November 1999 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 2005, 471). See: http://www.bechtel.com/1999-11-09.html.
[iv] *Tactics* refer to physical objectives within protest, while *strategies* reference overall questions of pressure, legitimacy, and political influence.
[v] As reflected, for example, in the *Cultural Anthropology* journal's Field Sights series "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt a Year after January 25th" (2012) and "Protesting Democracy in Brazil" (2013).
[vi] However, nonviolence theorist and trainer Starhawk (2010, 92–100) offers a detailed appraisal of a form of unarmed militancy, which she calls "high-confrontational struggle."
[vii] The quoted summary of the conversation and the revision to the PGA Hallmarks are preserved online at https://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/pga/hallm.htm.
[viii] At the other end of the political spectrum, conservative objections to the country's internationally high level of protest disruption is substantial, but these voices rarely distinguish, for example, between peaceful road blockades and combative protests. Intergovernmental aid programs have also aimed to demobilize the country's fractious political conflict (Ellison 2018).
[ix] At least twenty men, one woman, and six minors (one of them female) were hit with live ammunition (Salazar Ortuño 2011, 217–19). However, women sometimes successfully shamed the police (nearly all men) sent to attack them (Bustamante, Peredo, and Udaeta 2005).
[x] Juan Carlos Rodríguez, who took the name Campanas (church bells), was found hanging lifeless on a beam in the cathedral on April 9. Orellana Aillón (2004, 477) reports it is not clear whether he committed suicide or was hung by third parties.
[xi] A parallel interpretation comes from James Jasper (2011, 294): "Groups seem to be strengthened when they share reflex emotions in response to events and when they share affective loyalties to one another."

[xii] The widely acknowledged feeling of unity in the 2000 Water War broke down in Cochabamba by 2007, when racial, class, and political polarization divided the city. See chapter 5 of Bjork-James (2020).
[xiii] The Water Warriors have received limited scholarly attention as a part of Cochabamba's conflict in 2000, despite a variety of mentions in immediate accounts. Orellana Aillón conducted fieldwork, including interviews with three Water Warriors and situating their militancy in the larger context of the April mobilization. As was the case in my fieldwork, his interviewees did not include the urban poor youth who he sees as iconic representatives of this frontline group.
[xiv] See *La Razón* (2000).

[xv] This chant, an adaptation of a miners' union standard, refers to guns in the hands of the state. Massacres of Bolivian mineworkers occurred from the 1920s to the 1970s.
[xvi] They were also alluding to the military regimes of 1964 to 1982.
[xvii] Zeynep Tufekci (2017, 83ff) offers one consideration of these affinities around the overlapping phenomenon of networked plaza occupations.